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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, rates of crime in
Latin America and the Caribbean have increased
dramatically.1 However, post-transitional states
have generally failed to reform their security and
justice institutions to enable them to confront
these problems effectively and according to the
rule of law. Fanned by the media’s almost
obsessive focus on crime stories, the question of
insecurity has quickly risen to the top of the
regional agenda, consistently topping polls on
Latin American citizens’ concerns.2 Although
this widespread fear is often disproportionate
compared with actual crime figures, it has
prompted calls for hardline responses, which
states have usually heeded. Institutional violence
– the illegal repressive actions that security
agencies have carried out in the name of fighting
crime – has thus become one of the most
common sources of human rights violations in
post-authoritarian Latin America.
Conceptual debates on security in the continent
have mirrored these developments. The notion of
citizen security, coined in the 1990s in contrast to
the concept of national security, reflected a shift
in focus away from threats to the state towards
threats to public and social order posed by both
the rise in crime and the public’s fear of crime
(Neild 1999: 2), as well as growing concerns
about institutional violence. While there is an
ongoing discussion about the precise meaning of
this concept, what is relevant for the purposes of
this article is that it opens up a discussion about
the multiple factors that generate crime and
violence and places responsibility for security in
the hands of multiple actors, not merely security
agencies (Dammert and Zúñiga 2007).
This article will seek to shed light on the
dynamics between violence, insecurity and
human rights in contemporary Latin America.
The first section will examine the context in
which the concept of citizen security emerged.
We will argue that many of the problems
associated with contemporary institutional
violence are the consequences of unresolved
legacies of the military regimes that ruled most
Latin American countries for much of the
twentieth century. The second section will
discuss these challenges and the ways in which
human rights groups have responded to them.
We will contest the view that security is
incompatible with human rights, arguing that
this assumption fails to engage with the
complexity of the problem. In contrast, the third
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section will outline a human rights approach to
citizen security, based on broad policies that
promote inclusion, protect the rights of all social
sectors and view security problems as a systemic
issue. The final section will illustrate the ways in
which human rights advocates have used
regional institutional mechanisms to implement
this approach and win national political and legal
battles.
2 Authoritarian legacies and the failure to
reform security agencies after democratic
transitions
The levels of crime that Latin America has seen
since the 1980s are a relatively new
phenomenon, but the continent has a long legacy
of violence, repression and fear (Koonings and
Krujit 1999: 2) rooted in profound social
inequalities. The contemporary problems of
citizen security cannot be understood in isolation
from this authoritarian legacy, since many of its
long-term effects still plague Latin American
societies more than two decades after the return
of civilian rule.
2.1 The legacy from national security doctrines
During the Cold War, superpower competition
for geopolitical power and influence profoundly
affected developing nations. In many Latin
American countries, a succession of military
coups toppled democratically elected civilian
governments. The new regimes developed
National Security Doctrines (NSD), which put
the military in charge of national development
and public order and legitimised systematic
human rights violations in the name of
combating ‘internal ideological enemies’ (Neild
1999: 3). Under the NSD, the police were
controlled by the military; they were abusive,
often corrupt, and widely feared. Their mission
was not to protect citizens but to support the
political regime, and since they did not need
public legitimacy to operate effectively,
accountability mechanisms were practically non-
existent (Neild 1999).
Democratic transitions in Latin America have
tended to focus on military reforms and civil–
military relations, neglecting to transform the
culture and practices of the police forces (Ales et
al. 2004: 696). In addition to being abusive,
security agencies were poorly equipped,
underfunded and lacked training; therefore, they
were ill-prepared to deal with the rise in crime of
the 1980s and 1990s. The combination of
authoritarian practices and inefficiency resulted
in public distrust in the police, and, faced with
increasing public outrage about insecurity, some
governments resorted to re-engaging the armed
forces in policing tasks.3 But even in countries
that have held on to their hard-won restrictions
on military intervention in internal security
matters, such as Argentina, the legacy of military
rule still determines the way the police forces
approach crime. This is evidenced by the
persistence of semi-military policing models
(Chevigny 1999: 40–50), which share the rigid,
vertical, hierarchical structures of the armed
forces, as well as their resistance to any form of
external control (Ales et al. 2004: 595).
Semi-military policing models support the view
that ‘criminals’ are ‘enemies’ that must be
eliminated, and this view legitimises abhorrent
practices by the security forces. The logic of
security agencies is often to shoot first and ask
questions later, and summary executions – often
masked as confrontations with criminal suspects
– are commonplace. Thus, the abuse of deadly
force is widespread in Latin America. In poor
urban areas, it is seen as a means to manage
ordinary crime (Chevigny 1999: 53).
2.2 The persistence of undemocratic policing in
democratic states
The glaring contradiction between the notion of
democracy and the authoritarian approach to
policing described above begs the question: Why
have these deeply undemocratic practices
continued long after the end of military rule?
One reason is that police forces in Latin America
have rarely undergone processes of ‘vetting’ to
assess the aptitude of individual members for
public employment – especially in terms of their
respect for human rights – and remove
repressive elements (Duthie 2007: 17).
Consequently, ‘many law enforcement officials
who have to deal with common crimes are the
same ones who were previously asked to fight
subversion, and they are accustomed to fulfilling
their tasks with tactics and methods imposed in
dictatorial times’ (Méndez 1999: 21–2).
Such abusive officers have thrived largely thanks
to the prevalence of systems of impunity
throughout the criminal justice system
(Chevigny 1999: 57–9) in most of the continent.
From a human rights perspective, this is one of
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the gravest failings of democratisation processes.
The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) defines impunity as ‘the overall
lack of investigation, prosecution, capture, trial
and conviction of those responsible for the
violation of rights protected by the American
Convention’ (Altolaguirre 2003: 4).
The cycle of impunity begins inside the police
forces. The esprit de corps generated by the
military structures inherited from
authoritarianism has acted as a sort of protection
racket, allowing corruption to flourish.4 Yet
internal disciplining mechanisms are non-
existent or opaque. ‘Petty’ corruption – illegal
actions carried out by individual officers for
personal gain – is often overlooked by superiors.
‘Structural’ corruption, which is not the result of
an individual’s deviation, but consists of illegal
actions promoted and motivated by security
agencies’ institutional objectives (Ales et al. 2004:
596–7), is actively encouraged. Put differently,
‘structural’ corruption is part of the ‘set of
routines (legal and illegal) that the police
assumes as “its job” and through which it
controls crime’ (Ales et al. 2004: 602). An
example of this type of corruption is the common
practice of inventing non-existent crimes to
justify the arrest and trial of innocent and
vulnerable people in order to meet detention
quotas and appear efficient (Ales et al. 2004).
At the judicial level, not much energy goes into
prosecuting corrupt or abusive police officers.
Convictions are rare, and even then sentences
are lenient. The police have many ways of
obstructing investigations, such as planting
weapons on victims and tampering with the
evidence. Even when cases make it to court,
proceedings are often opaque and, therefore,
receive little publicity. In some cases, like in
Brazil, Colombia and Chile, the police are not
even subject to ordinary justice but are tried in
military courts, whose procedures are even more
obscure and rarely result in convicting police
officers (Chevigny 1999: 57–9).
2.3 Insecurity for all, security for some
The persistence of brutal police practices and
systems of impunity is, ultimately, underpinned
by the unequal social order that characterises
most Latin American societies. The transition
from military to civilian-led government has
often not been enough to change this, and the
actions of the police continue to reproduce this
underlying social order (Chevigny 1995). This
explains, at least in part, why hardline policies
are so popular. Violent crime predominantly
affects the poor and marginalised sectors, among
them young people, immigrants from bordering
countries and those living in emergency
neighbourhoods. In Argentina, for example, 43
per cent of the murders committed in the city of
Buenos Aires in 2005 took place in the south.
This area, which is home to 30.7 per cent of the
city’s population, houses 60.2 per cent of the
population whose basic needs are not met.5 Yet
the middle and upper classes see crime as a
problem that mostly plagues them, and for which
the poor are to blame (Pinheiro 1999: 5).
These societies, in which only some citizens enjoy
citizenship6 rights and security as yet another
unequally distributed good, have been termed
‘uncivil democracies’ (Neild 1999: 6) or
‘democracies without citizenship’ (Pinheiro 1999:
2). The defining trait of such uncivil democracies
is the clear disjuncture that exists between
democracy ‘on paper’ and the practice of law
enforcement.
3 Citizen security and human rights: the
challenges for activists
The complex scenario described above has
presented human rights organisations working
on the issue of citizen security with a series of
challenges. Two are particularly relevant to our
analysis: the first is related to the historical role
of human rights groups vis-à-vis the state; the
second has to do with the political debate on the
causes and cures of insecurity and violence.
3.1 From preventing abuses to building state capacity
In Argentina, the human rights movement
gained momentum during the military
dictatorship (1976–83), when dozens of women
would gather at the Plaza de Mayo, in downtown
Buenos Aires, carrying pictures of their loved
ones and demanding to know their whereabouts.
Following the collapse of the military regime,
activists focused on two objectives: investigating
the fate of the thousands abducted during the
dictatorship and later prosecuting members of
the armed and security forces that had taken
part in human rights violations during that time
(Jelin 1995). This focus on investigating and
punishing abuses committed by state officials –
that is, on the limits of state power – was a
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pattern common to rights defenders in most
authoritarian states.
While the above concerns persisted after the
return of democracy, the focus of human rights
groups broadened in line with political changes.
In the 1990s, activists became alarmed by the
dramatic increase in cases of police brutality,
corruption and arbitrary detentions that
accompanied rising crime rates. Moreover, the
fear of insecurity, combined with violent policing
and a poorly functioning criminal justice system,
made abuse of pre-trial detention a widespread
and socially acceptable practice in Latin
America. In many countries, 70–80 per cent of
detainees have not been convicted (Méndez
2003: 23). Across the continent, inmates in
chronically overcrowded prisons endure poor
health conditions, sexual violence and regular
massacres in response to the frequent riots and
uprisings (Pinheiro 1999: 4).
Human rights groups continue to defend the
victims. Yet, since citizen security and human
rights are issues that deeply affect democratic
governance, it became clear that they could not
be addressed by focusing exclusively on limiting
state power. Thus, from the 1990s, human rights
organisations have faced a new, fundamental
challenge: how to continue denouncing state
abuse while also advocating for the state to
develop security and justice institutions that
abide by the rule of law and international human
rights standards. A few Latin American human
rights organisations, such as the Centre for
Legal and Social Studies (CELS) in Argentina,
the Institute for Legal Defence (IDL) in Peru,
and Viva Río in Brazil, embraced this challenge
and began to address ‘the function, as well as the
behaviour, of the state’ (ICHRP 2003).
There are some inherent tensions in this nascent
role of ‘critical engagement’, as Neild (1999)
points out. For example, it is more difficult for
human rights advocates to promote controls on
police actions than it is to engage with complex
institutional reforms, since often changes
happen at the level of police management where
human rights activists have little access (Neild
1999: 18–19). Nevertheless, this ‘emerging dual
role’ has helped activists address a related
challenge that stems from the fact that the
targets of state violence have changed. As Juan
Mendez observes, it is no longer political
adversaries that suffer torture, extra judicial
executions and forced disappearances at the
hands of the police and the military. Nowadays,
victims are usually anonymous young men and
women from poor areas whose victimisation does
not make headline news or stir up international
sympathies (Méndez 1999: 19–20). Moreover,
since most victims of police abuse are believed to
have engaged in some kind of illegal behaviour,
human rights groups that focus only on the
limits of state power leave themselves open to
accusations that they are ‘defending the
criminals’ (ICHRP 2003: 38).
3.2 Contesting the dominant discourse
The view that human rights activists work for
criminals and against society is rooted in a
widespread discourse that pits order against
human rights and calls for a permanent state of
emergency. This logic is underpinned by a
rationale of war against chaos, which, consistent
with the military approach to policing described
previously, legitimises restricting citizens’ rights
and penalising the poor. Countering this
widespread discourse has been one of the
toughest challenges for human rights groups
since the return of democracy.
The notion that human rights must be sacrificed
to achieve security is deeply flawed on several
accounts. First, the idea of achieving security
through lawlessness is absurd, as Chevigny
argues. The use of torture to extract confessions
is a case in point. Not only does this result in the
violation of human rights and the conviction of
innocent people, but it also means that crimes
are not adequately investigated and culprits
remain free. Eventually, citizens lose faith in the
criminal justice system (Chevigny 1999: 60).
Second, the idea is inaccurate. There is no
conclusive evidence to prove that hardline
policies reduce crime rates. The case of El
Salvador, which has one of the highest homicide
rates in the world, is illuminating. In 2003, the
government implemented a series of highly
publicised hardline, or mano dura, policies to curb
crime and violence. When crime rates did not go
down, they developed super mano dura policies.
The prison population increased, but crime
figures continued to rise; the homicide rate in El
Salvador is currently 46 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants, which qualifies as endemic
(Kliksberg 2008). On the other hand, there is a
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direct correlation between the implementation
of hardline policies and the incidence of human
rights violations. A 2006 study on the impact of
these policies reported that ‘crime has risen,
gangs have grown more complex and
professional, human rights violations have
increased, particularly against the young [and]
the prison situation has got worse […] all of
which has aggravated institutional weakness and
threatened the rule of law’ (cited in Garber
2008: 14–15).
4 A human rights approach to citizen security7
In general, the various proposals for dealing with
insecurity revolve around the management of
coercive power, arguing for more or less intensity
or regulation in the use of force. However, this is
only one dimension of the problem, the depth of
which is often lost in media and political analysis.
In contrast, an analysis of crime and institutional
violence from a human rights perspective draws
attention to the fact that the problems of citizen
security not only affect the right to non-
interference but also involve basic issues
regarding relationships among citizens, between
citizens and institutions, and among the
institutions themselves. A broad notion of citizen
security must aim to guarantee the conditions
for the full enjoyment of collective, as well as
individual, rights.
This approach does not mean inaction in the face
of crime and violence. On the contrary, it means
the active rejection of reductionist and
authoritarian views. It implies making the most
of the capacities and experience of other public
institutions, apart from those traditionally
responsible for public order, to formulate and
implement security polices. Crucially, it involves
developing inclusive security policies that protect
the rights of all citizens and promote greater
social integration, instead of protecting the rights
of certain sectors at the expense of the rights of
others and encouraging segregation and
victimisation. At its most basic, an inclusive
approach to citizen security should aim to control
violence and reconstruct the bonds of citizenship.
4.1 Controlling violence
An inclusive approach to citizen security
acknowledges the pressing issue of violence but
calls for the recognition that crime is only one
element of the problem. Institutional violence
also poses a serious risk to the lives and integrity
of citizens, and debates and policies on citizen
security must not lose sight of this.
Thus, policies designed to control violence must
start by acknowledging that modern security
agencies are both part of the problem of violence
and part of the solution. Consequently, they must
consider the ways in which security agencies
influence the social circulation of violence to
avoid the reproduction of violent dynamics in the
management of conflicts.
In order to control institutional violence and
transform the security sector so it is compatible
with democracy, security agencies need to
undergo comprehensive reforms. These reforms
entail rethinking the governance and practices of
police forces, the ways in which they relate
internally and to other institutions, and their
links with civil society. The excessive autonomy
of the forces must be curtailed and political
control cemented as a means to increase
transparency. The idea is not merely to keep
strict controls on police behaviour but to
generate new practices and a more professional
culture. The success of police reforms must not
only be measured in terms of crime reduction,
real or perceived, but also with regards to the
police’s ability to operate within the bounds of
the law (Garber 2008: 22).
Needless to say, for democratic police reforms to
be successful and durable it is essential to
combat impunity effectively. This is not only
necessary to curb institutional violence in the
continent, but also a condition for the
consolidation of democracy (Altolaguirre 2003:
3). In other words, the rule of law can only be
fully realised if and when impunity is tackled at
every level – from dismantling the structures
that enable and perpetuate corruption among
police forces, to guaranteeing access to
information, to countering the apathy of the
administration of justice.
4.2 Reconstructing citizenship bonds
Reactionary approaches to insecurity not only
foster more violence, but they also promote
spatial segregation within cities, effectively
turning certain areas associated with specific
social sectors into ghettoes (Pires do Rio Caldeira
2000). An example of such policies is a crime
prevention plan that the Argentine government
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adopted in response to increased public demand
for security.8 The plan was implemented in the
three villas de emergencia (slums) with the highest
levels of crime, where elements of organised
crime were known to operate. The three villas
were effectively subjected to a military siege, with
over 1,000 officers deployed around their
perimeter to control the points of entry and exit,
turning every resident of the villas into a virtual
criminal suspect (CELS 2004). This kind of
spatial segregation, common to all of Latin
America, contributes to the stigmatisation of
excluded social sectors as ‘dangerous classes’,
which generates a fear of the ‘other’ among the
privileged that justifies calls for hardline policies,
as discussed above.
In contrast, a broad, inclusive approach to citizen
security highlights the need to develop policies
that tackle crime without deepening social
exclusion. To this end, this approach
contemplates actions that seek to broaden
citizenship as a powerful integrating tool. This
means focusing on crime prevention rather than
merely its punishment. It means developing
integral polices that involve not only security
agencies but also civil society and local actors. It
implies incorporating a social policies perspective
into the way we think about security – ranging
from employment and labour policies to those
related to public space, social bonds and health.
5 Citizen security in the Inter-American Human
Rights System
Just as the transitions to democracy brought new
challenges and opportunities for human rights
defenders at home, regional human rights
mechanisms evolved considerably after the
return of civilian rule. The new context offered
new possibilities for activists, who have honed
their advocacy strategies accordingly.
5.1 Standard setting
During the dictatorships, human rights groups
looked to the Inter-American System for the
Protection of Human Rights (particularly its two
main institutions for the protection and
promotion of human rights, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights) as a
means to exert pressure on authoritarian
governments. The first cases the system resolved
involved forced disappearances, massacres and
extra-judicial executions. With the advent of
democracy, and in the face of the constant failure
of national safeguard mechanisms, protecting
victims of human rights abuses remained a
priority. Yet, in the new democratic context,
international legal instruments began to provide
not only a last resort for protection, but also a
source of principles on basic rights that aimed to
promote and guide processes of institutional
reform and democratic consolidation (CELS
2008: 41). In other words, the Inter-American
System’s opinions, cases, and reports began to be
interpreted in a way that generated standards
and imposed a series of positive obligations on
states regarding the use of force, interrogations,
searches, pre-trial detention, the differences
between police and military functions and equal
access to justice, among other issues.
The Bulacio case – a 17-year-old boy who was
randomly arrested and died after being injured
by police officers in Buenos Aires – was the first
time the IACHR focused on the repressive
policies of the Argentine state after the end of
the dictatorship; its illegal means of social
control (such as arbitrary mass detentions, or
razzias); torture and deaths in custody; the
complicity of the judiciary in police brutality; and
the violation of the rights of children (CELS
2008: 182).
In the Bulacio case, the IACHR ruling addressed
both the state’s responsibility regarding the
abuse of rights and its duty to implement
institutional police reforms to prevent further
abuses (CELS 2008: 186–7). The ruling brought
hope to Bulacio’s relatives, and it imposed
unavoidable obligations on the Argentine state
(CELS 2008: 189). This paradigmatic case
highlighted the potential of using regional legal
mechanisms to implement human rights
standards nationally. However, it also highlights
the limits of such strategies; five years after the
ruling, Argentina has paid financial reparations
as instructed, but it has yet to investigate and
punish those responsible for Bulacio’s illegal
detention and death, and to fully change the laws
and practices that condoned them (Tiscornia
2008).
5.2 International policy advocacy
Recently, some human rights groups have begun
to seek innovative ways to place human rights at
the centre of regional debates on citizen security.
In 2005, a coalition of human rights organisations9
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working on citizen security in the region joined
forces to improve civil society’s strategies in the
framework of the Inter-American System. The
coalition resolved that a key step to bring a
human rights perspective to the regional debate
on citizen security – which focused on issues such
as the modernisation of the police institution but
often neglected to consider the needs of the most
vulnerable – was to involve the IACHR in the
discussion. To this end, coalition members
researched and compiled current human rights
standards, based on decisions by regional and
international bodies, on issues related to citizen
security in Latin America. The three resulting
documents were presented at a hearing with the
IACHR in October 2005. Based on these
documents, the IACHR agreed to commission a
Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights in
the Hemisphere (currently under way) to serve as
a guide for Latin American states in their
development of security policies respectful of
human rights.
Meanwhile, the Organization of American States
(OAS) announced the First Meeting of Ministers
Responsible for Public Security in the Americas,
which would take place in October 2008. This
conference was to produce a declaration and a
plan of action on citizen security in the
Americas. The coalition deemed it necessary to
take part in this process – and also urged the
IACHR to do so – to expand its work promoting
regional human rights standards to the OAS.
Members of the coalition were allowed to take
part in the conference as observers. Prior to the
conference, they analysed the official
declaration10 and issued a joint statement11 in
which they noted the positive aspects of the
official declaration and made several
recommendations. The statement from civil
society organisations was published on the
conference website and issued to participants
alongside the official declaration.
6 Conclusion
This article has focused on the relationship
between violence, insecurity and human rights in
Latin America. It has examined the context in
which the debates on citizen security emerged
and the challenges that this scenario posed for
human rights activists; their responses to these
challenges and the strategies they have adopted
using international institutional mechanisms.
While the triumph of democracy after decades of
military rule brought high hopes for Latin
America, in many ways the rule of law has not
been consolidated. Post-transitional countries
have focused on curbing their armies, with
varying degrees of success, but security agencies
continue to reproduce an approach to policing
learned from the military regimes – violent and
unaccountable, designed to quell dissent at any
cost. When crime figures began to rise rapidly in
the 1980s and 1990s, security forces were
unprepared to respond democratically without
the use of violence and coercion.
Undemocratic practices, such as summary
executions and torture, have spread to endemic
levels in Latin America, shielded behind systems
of impunity that operate at every level of the
criminal justice system. The question is why
these systems of impunity have not been
dismantled, decades after democratisation and
despite the adoption of numerous human rights
treaties and norms. We have argued that this is
largely due to the prevalence of ‘dual societies’ in
most of Latin America, characterised by vast
inequalities between different social sectors,
which democracy has done little to remedy. In
these societies, the privileged see the job of the
police as protecting them from the poor, who are
stigmatised as criminals. As long as police
violence and impunity affect mostly the poor, the
privileged will continue to turn a blind eye to
their egregious human rights violations.
There are practical reasons for breaking this
cycle of violence and impunity, as well as reasons
of principle. Hardline policies seek to allay the
fear of insecurity of the privileged sectors, but
they have not been proven to reduce the levels of
crime. They have, however, reinforced social
exclusion and stigmatisation, mostly among poor
young males. While the relationship between
exclusion and delinquency is complex, and
beyond the scope of this article, it is obvious that
this is no prescription for crime prevention.
In short, the view that rights must be sacrificed
to guarantee security not only generates
ineffective policies, but it comes at a great cost to
our societies. As Rachel Neild (1999) notes, 
… the failure to deepen democracy and the
rule of law and extend citizenship rights
across all social sectors shakes public
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confidence in the police and judicial system,
weakens the rule of law and increasingly
undermines support for democracy. 
(Neild 1999: 6)
Against this narrow view, this article has put
forward a broader approach to citizen security to
match a broader notion of citizenship. This
human rights approach is based on inclusive
policies that protect the rights of all citizens, in
contrast to those that encourage segregation and
victimisation. It seeks to tackle both crime and
violence at the root, and it is based on the
premise that respect for human rights is not an
obstacle, but a condition to achieve security.
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Notes
1 Citing the WHO, Kliksberg (2008) notes that
rates of homicides in Latin America have
doubled in the last quarter of a century. In
1980 the average annual rate of homicides
was 12.5 per 100,000 inhabitants; in 2006 it
was 25.1.
2 The latest Latinobarometro poll shows that in
many Latin American countries, crime and
public safety is seen as the most important




3 The military have carried out policing
activities with the consent of the government
in Brazil, Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador and
Mexico, among others.
4 The latest Latinobarometro poll notes that, in
the last few years, the tendency is for




5 Source: National Criminal Data System
(Sistema Nacional de Información Criminal,
SNIC) of the National Directorate for
Criminal Policy, National Justice and Human
Rights Ministry of Argentina.
6 Citizenship here is understood in reference to
social inclusion and the ability to exercise
collective and individual rights, rather than in
the more limited sense of political citizenship.
7 Unless otherwise specified, this section is
based on the document Políticas Públicas y
Seguridad en una Sociedad Democrática. Más
Derechos, más Seguridad, which is the product of
an initiative led by the Centre for Legal and
Social Studies. The document was produced
jointly by CELS and various other non-
government organisations, associations,
research centres and individuals.
8 This was the Plan de Protección Integral de Barrios
(PPIB), part of the Argentine government’s
National Plan for Crime Prevention.
9 The organisations that make up this coalition
are: the Centre for Legal and Social Studies
(CELS) from Argentina; Conectas Direitos
Humanos/Sur – Rede Universitaria de
Direitos Humanos and Viva Río from Brazil;
the Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL) from
Peru; the Fundación de Estudios para la
Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD) and the
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